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Note
Can't Cap Corporate Greed:
Unintended Consequences of Trying
to Control Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code
Ryan Miske*
Richard Grasso, former chairman and chief executive of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), is just the latest example of
corporate greed. In fall 2003, Grasso resigned after several
weeks of "blistering criticism" regarding his compensation. 1
While Grasso served as chairman and chief executive, the
NYSE's directors gave him a pay package totaling $188 mil-• 2
lion. Eighty million dollars of the pay package represented
pension benefits that a consultant advised the directors were
six times more generous than those at similar financial services
companies.3 In addition, some of the directors who approved
Grasso's compensation were executives of Wall Street firms
that Grasso was responsible for regulating.4 After Grasso with-
drew $139.5 million in deferred savings and retirement bene-
fits, his total compensation was disclosed to the public and a
firestorm of criticism ensued.'
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
Carleton College. The Author would like to thank Emily Pruisner, Eliot
Wrenn, Alyn Bedford, John Stern, and Jeffrey DeBruin for their editorial as-
sistance. The Author would also like to thank Professor Gregg Polsky, Tho-
mas Morgan, Michael Stanchfield, and Justice Russell Anderson for their ad-
vice. This article is dedicated to David Garrett and Meghan Ryan for their
unwavering support.
1. Gretchen Morgenson & Landon Thomas, Jr., Chairman Quits Stock
Exchange in Furor over Pay: But Grasso Departure Is Unlikely to End Scrutiny
of Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at Al.
2. Landon Thomas, Jr., Officials in 2 States Urge Big Board Chief to
Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al.
3. Floyd Norris, More Changes in Store for the Big Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2003, at Cl.
4. Landon Thomas, Jr., Grasso's Fate Is in Hands of Undecided: Some
Directors Remain in Wait-and-See Mode, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at Cl.
5. Thomas, supra note 2. The compensation scandal was recently cited in
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The debate over executive compensation has raged for two
decades.6 Some commentators argue that executive compensa-
tion has become inappropriate Others argue that executive
compensation is strongly correlated with corporate perform-
ance. As the scholarly debate persists, some federal legislators
have weighed in by proposing tax code provisions to cap execu-
tive compensation. In 1991, Representative Martin Sabo spon-
sored legislation that would have denied company tax deduc-
tions for executive pay in excess of twenty-five times the lowest
compensation paid to any employee in that company.9 In 1992,
Senator Tom Harkin introduced legislation that would have
capped reasonable compensation at only $500,000.10
Although the proposals to limit executive compensation
have certainly outnumbered the enactments, three sections of
the tax code have been implemented within the last two dec-
ades with the intent to cap executive compensation in public
corporations. 1 In 1984, Congress enacted § 280G, disallowing a
deduction for any golden parachute12 in excess of three times
the executive's annual compensation during the last five years,
a class action suit filed against the NYSE on behalf of the California Public
Employees' Retirement System on December 16, 2003. Jeff Chorney, CalPERS
Taps Lerach for Suit Against NYSE, THE RECORDER, Dec. 17, 2003, at 1. A
lawyer for the plaintiff class, William Lerach of Milberg Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, noted that Grasso's "obscene" compensation package provided evi-
dence of "the exchange's inability to effectively police its members." Id.
6. See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Mar-
kets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (1983) (indicating that a new wave
of concern about the enormity of executive compensation may be developing).
7. See Unnecessary Business Subsidies: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on the Budget, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Ad-
vocate, describing executive compensation as "bloated"); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN
SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 29-
31 (1991) (describing America's system of executive compensation as "rotten to
the core").
8. See, e.g., Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June
1992, at 28, 30-32; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel
They Get, HARv. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125, 125.
9. H.R. 3056, 102d Cong. (1991).
10. S. 2329, 102d Cong. (1992).
11. I.R.C. §§ 162(m), 280G, 4999 (2000). Section 162(a)(1) monitors rea-
sonable compensation primarily in closely held corporations and was enacted
in 1918. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat.
1057, 1077 (1919).
12. A golden parachute is "[aln employment-contract provision that grants
an upper-level executive lucrative severance benefits-including long-term
salary guarantees or bonuses-if control of the company changes hands (as by
a merger)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (7th ed. 1999).
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and § 4999, requiring executives to pay a nondeductible 20%
excise tax on any excess parachute payment.'3 In 1993, Presi-
dent Clinton signed into law § 162(m), disallowing the deducti-
bility of certain corporate executive compensation exceeding $1
million. 4 Those sections, however, have not been a panacea for
capping corporate greed, and the concern over executive com-
pensation has not waned. After the dust settles from the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act," political pressure may build and another tax
provision designed to cap executive compensation may make its
way through Congress. Before that happens, it is important to
learn from past mistakes.
This Note investigates the effectiveness of Congress in cap-
ping executive compensation in public companies through the
use of the tax code. Part I discusses the regulation of executive
compensation prior to the enactment of § 280G, § 4999, and
§ 162(m). Part II explores the functionality, legislative history,
and unintended results of § 280G and § 4999. Part III describes
the functionality, legislative history, and unintended results of
§ 162(m). Part IV asserts that tax reform will not be effective in
limiting executive compensation as long as directors are not in-
dependent, and tax reform will not be necessary if directors are
independent. This Note concludes that the federal government
will not be successful in capping executive compensation by
providing disincentives through the tax code and suggests that
director independence is the best way to ensure reasonable ex-
ecutive compensation.
I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRIOR
TO § 280G, § 4999, AND § 162(m)
Prior to the enactment of § 280G, § 4999, and § 162(m),
golden parachute payments and executive compensation in
publicly held companies were only subject to the general rule
13. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494,
585-87 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999). Recipients of golden para-
chutes are denied a deduction for the § 4999 excise tax. I.R.C. § 27 5 (a)(6).
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13,211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 470-71 (1993).
15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.). This
statute represents "the most sweeping revision of the securities laws since the
New Deal ... [and] the deepest incursion by the federal governance into the
internal affairs of U.S. corporations." ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS
AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 716 (8th ed. 2003).
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under § 162(a)(1), 6 which limits a company's tax deduction for
employee compensation to reasonable compensation. 17 Courts
traditionally rely on the amount test when determining the
reasonableness of compensation."8 The amount test, which var-
ies by jurisdiction, analyzes whether the amount of the pay-
ment is reasonable in relation to the services performed. 9 The
concept of reasonableness is primarily intended to stop closely
held businesses from artificially increasing employee compen-
sation in an attempt to disburse profits in a deductible form, as
opposed to a nondeductible form such as gifts or dividends.2 °
The reasonableness limitation does not police compensation
in arm's length business relationships such as those that exist
in large public companies. 2' Given the ineffectiveness of
§ 162(a)(1) in policing compensation in publicly held companies
and the continued astronomical amounts of executive compen-
sation,22 Congress sought to further regulate executive compen-
sation.
II. CONGRESS'S ATTEMPT TO CAP EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION WITH § 280G AND § 4999
This part briefly describes the functionality of § 280G and
§ 4999 of the tax code. After explaining how these sections op-
erate, this part will examine Congress's intentions when enact-
ing these provisions. Finally, this part will demonstrate that
§ 280G and § 4999 have unintended and undesirable conse-
quences.
A. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF § 280G AND § 4999
Sections 280G and 4999, enacted simultaneously, apply to
payments that (1) are contingent on a change in control of a
corporation or change in ownership of a substantial portion of a
16. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (allowing a deduction for all ordinary and necessary
business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year, including "a rea-
sonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services ac-
tually rendered").
17. See GERALD A. KAFKA, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS: REASONABLE
COMPENSATION A-3 (3d ed. 2003).
18. Id.
19. Id. at A-13.
20. Id. at A-3.
21. Id.
22. See Henry F. Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute" Agreements: The
Taxman Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 49-50 nn.25-26 (1985).
[Vol 88:16731676
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corporation's assets, and (2) have a present value equal to or in
excess of the average annual compensation of the executive.2 3 If
these conditions are met, the sections provide two basic penal-
ties: § 280G denies the employer a deduction under § 162(a) for
employee compensation in the form of an "excess parachute
payment,"24 and under § 4999, the employee must pay a nonde-
ductible 20% excise tax on the same parachute payment.25
A "parachute payment" is defined by the sections as a
payment that (1) is within the definition of compensation, (2) is
given to a "disqualified individual,"26 and (3) is contingent on a
change in control or ownership of either a corporation or a sub-
stantial portion of a corporation's assets.27 A parachute pay-
ment is considered excessive and is subject to a 20% excise tax
if it equals or exceeds three times the base amount 2 and it
cannot be proven reasonable compensation.29 Usually, the base
amount is determined by considering the taxpayer's average
gross income for the five years prior to the tax year at issue.
3 0
Finally, there is a special rule of proof and a rebuttable
presumption contained in the golden parachute provisions. If
an employer argues that a parachute payment is reasonable,
the case must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 3' Ab-
sent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a payment
made based on a contract entered into, or amended, within a
year before the change in control is presumed to be a parachute
payment. 3' Rarely will prior services for which an employee was
23. I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(2)(A), 4999(b) (2000). The sections also apply to
payments made pursuant to an agreement that violates any generally en-
forced securities laws or regulations. Id. §§ 280G(b)(2)(B), 4999(b).
24. Id. § 280G(a).
25. Id. § 4999(a).
26. A "disqualified individual" is a person who (1) is an employee, inde-
pendent contractor, or other person who performs services for a corporation,
and (2) is an officer, shareholder, or highly compensated individual of the cor-
poration. Id. § 280G(c). Only employees earning $80,000, as indexed for infla-
tion, in annualized compensation during the period in question may qualify as
highly compensated. Treas. Reg. § 1.280G-1, Q/A-19(a) (2003) (cross-
referencing I.R.C. § 414(q)(1)(B)(i)).
27. I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(2)(A), 4999(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.280G-1, QIA-2(a)
(2003).
28. I.R.C. §§ 280G(b), 4999(b).
29. Id. § 280G(b)(4).
30. Id. § 280G(b)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.280G-1, Q/A 34, 35 (2003).
31. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4).
32. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(C). In such circumstances, contracts of this kind are
often viewed as "last minute appropriations of corporate assets." See Gaillard
v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing
2004] 1677
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under-compensated be considered when determining the rea-
sonableness of a parachute payment. 3 Congress made several
mechanical amendments to § 280G in 1986,34 and enacted addi-
tional technical amendments to § 280G in 1988. 35
B. WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO ACCOMPLISH WITH § 280G
AND § 4999
Sections 280G and 4999 were enacted because Congress
believed that corporate decision making in takeover situations
should not be critically influenced by executives' concern for
their own personal benefit.3 6 Takeover situations create an in-
herent conflict of interest because management may be disin-
clined to complete a merger or acquisition that may put their
job at risk, even though the merger or acquisition would be
beneficial to their shareholders.37 Congress concluded that, in
many circumstances, parachute agreements simply keep en-
trenched management in control. 38 Parachute agreements may
do this by increasing the cost to a potential buyer, which dis-
courages acquisitions. Excessive parachute payments may
summary judgment in favor of board members who had approved golden para-
chute contracts for certain top executives in the midst of a hostile takeover
battle).
33. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-861, at 852 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1540.
34. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 Stat. 2085,
2807-09. The amendments created exemptions for "payments relating to small
businesses; [payments in] corporations without readily tradable stock, if
shareholder approval is obtained; and payments to or from qualified pension,
annuity, and simplified employee pension plans." KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-
37 (footnotes omitted) (citing I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(5)(A)(i)-(ii), (b)(5)(B), (b)(6)).
35. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, § 1018(d)(6)-(8), 102 Stat. 3342, 3581 (1988). These amendments gave the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the authority to institute shareholder approval
requirements for corporations without readily tradable stock. See I.R.C.
§ 280G(b)(5)(B). The IRS proposed regulations to § 280G in both 1989 and
2002. See Golden Parachute Payments, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,390 (proposed May 5,
1989) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Golden Parachute Payments, 67 Fed.
Reg. 7630 (proposed Feb. 20, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). Final
golden parachute regulations were not issued until 2003. See Golden Para-
chute Payments, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,745. The final regulations apply to any para-
chute payment that occurred on or after January 1, 2004. Id.
36. See KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-37.
37. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35
VILL. L. REV. 131, 150 (1990).
38. S. PRT. No. 98-169, vol. 1, at 195 (1984).
39. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985)
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also encourage executives to implement a proposed takeover
that would reward them handsomely, although it might not be
in the best interests of shareholders." Recognizing that such
payouts were tax deductible as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses, the Senate Finance Committee declared its un-
willingness to have the tax law subsidize golden parachute
agreements, and advocated the enactment of a tax penalty for
such agreements.4'
C. THE UNINTENDED RESULTS OF § 280G AND § 4999
Commentators have generally been critical of the use of the
tax code to control executive compensation. As one commenta
tor noted soon after the provisions were passed, "Congress has,
as usual, made an opening move in a corporate chess game and
neglected to consider its opponents' countermoves." 3 Similarly,
practitioners have noted that "[b]road-based legislative solu-
tions may be good politics, but too often they result in bad pol-
icy."44 Creative corporate attorneys, accountants, and business-
people can find ways to circumvent tax disincentives. There
have been three pernicious, unintended consequences of § 280G
and § 4999: (1) setting parachute payments at three times base
salary has become the congressionally sanctioned standard of
reasonableness for such payments; (2) some companies will-
ingly exceed the standard and grant gross ups which provide an
additional payment to the executive, such that after taxes the
executive receives the same pay he would have had the excise
tax not existed;4 5 and (3) other companies include provisions
providing either the full severance payment (without a gross
up) or the capped payment, whichever results in the executive
receiving the greater amount.
(noting that golden parachutes may be used as a defense against takeovers).
40. See Philip L. Cochran & Steven L. Wartick, "Golden Parachutes": A
Closer Look, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1984, at 111, 123.
41. S. PRT. NO. 98-169, vol. 1, at 195.
42. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Ex-
ecutive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81, 94-100 (1998); Bruce A.
Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV.
125, 128-29 (2001); Zelinsky, supra note 37, at 187-92.
43. Graef S. Crystal, Congress Thinks It Knows Best About Executive
Compensation, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1984, at 16.
44. Brownstein & Panner, supra note 8, at 32.
45. See Wolk, supra note 42, at 139-40.
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1. Congressionally Sanctioned Standard of Reasonableness
After the enactment of § 280G and § 4999, golden para-
chutes "rapidly spread" to boardrooms representing many in-
dustries.4 By codifying a salary multiple, § 280G created a floor
on parachute benefits that directors and executives could point
to as a congressionally sanctioned standard of reasonableness.47
As a result, companies are more likely to set the payouts to atS48
least 299% of the executives' base compensation. Shareholders
have also become accustomed to this baseline. In 2003, eight-
een companies voted on shareholder proposals asking for share-
holder approval of future executive severance agreements
exceeding 299% of base compensation. 49 Fourteen of the pro-
posals received a majority vote, with 56.9% being the average
vote in support of the proposals.50 In comparison, only two such
proposals received a majority vote in 2002, and no such pro-
posal received a majority vote in 2000 or 2001.51 The average
vote in support of such proposals during 2000-2002 never ex-
ceeded 35% 52
The establishment of a congressional standard complicates
the purpose of parachute payments and is detrimental to
shareholders. Golden parachutes are intended to compensate
executives for the risks of being discharged due to a takeover.
5 3
They are adopted in the hopes of attracting talented leaders to
organizations prone to takeover.54 Without appropriate golden
46. Carol Bowie & Judy Fischer, Have Parachutes Become More Than Se-
curity Blankets?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 17, 18. Ac-
cording to an annual summary by Executive Compensation Reports of change-
in-control provisions at more than 1000 corporations, the number of companies
with golden parachutes climbed 63% between 1987 and 1995. Id.
47. Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39
STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 n.38 (1987).
48. See Bowie & Fischer, supra note 46, at 18.
49. See HEWITT ASSOCS., LLC, EXECOMP MARKETRENDS: 2003 GOLDEN
PARACHUTE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 1 (2004) (on file with author).
50. Id. Nowhere is the success of shareholder proposals more pronounced
than in the context of limiting severance payments for executives. Id.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. "Academic studies have verified that CEOs encourage value-creating
mergers and takeovers when they are protected, and fight them when they are
not." Carl R. Weinberg, CEO Compensation: How Much Is Enough?, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE (presenting the results of its 2000 Annual CEO Compensation
Review), at http://www.chiefexecutive.net/bench/compensa/ceocomp2000.htm
(last visited Feb. 12, 2004). According to Weinberg, "change-of-control sever-
ance protection is a shareholder-friendly program." Id.
54. Bress, supra note 47, at 958. Golden parachutes also deter takeovers
1680 [Vol 88:1673
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parachutes, companies and industries at risk of takeover must
use other incentives to lure managerial talent."5 To do so, they
may increase annual compensation, cash bonuses, or stock op-
tions to provide the same expected benefit as a golden para-
chute.56 This is even more detrimental to shareholders because
the risk of a potential takeover is paid upfront on an annual
basis rather than deferred until the actual change in control
occurs. A higher annual salary also makes it more difficult for
existing managers to objectively evaluate tender offers or po-
tential mergers." Golden parachutes create indifference when
they offset what the executive would expect to lose by being
severed.58 It is not possible for Congress to estimate this equi-
librium point for all companies and industries. Instead, it must
be left to the individual companies. Therefore, the congression-
ally sanctioned standard of reasonableness established by
§ 280G has a negative effect unintended by Congress.
2. Gross Ups
Another unintended result of § 280G and § 4999 that is
detrimental to shareholders is the emergence of gross ups. 9 A
gross up gives the executive an additional payment to cover the
excise tax and any income and employment taxes resulting
from the additional payment. 60 Based on a 1999 Hewitt Associ-
ates survey, gross ups were employed by 64% of Fortune 200
by increasing the cost of an acquisition. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text (noting that golden parachutes are one of many defensive tactics used by
management to deter or defeat tender offers).
55. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1236 (1984) ("[T]o the extent that job security is re-
duced, the executive should demand much higher compensation for his ser-
vices."); Ann M. Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13,
1982, at 82, 83 (reporting that golden parachutes are often necessary to retain
high-level employees).
56. The expected value of a conditional payment is determined by multi-
plying the amount of the conditional payment by the probability of its receipt.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 27 (1983).
57. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1217
n.60 (1984).
58. Bress, supra note 47, at 972 (analyzing golden parachutes within an
insurance law framework).
59. According to a 1991 study of golden parachute agreements by Execu-
tive Compensation Reports, 38% promised to pay a gross up. Bowie & Fischer,
supra note 46, at 19. A similar study, conducted in 1996, showed an increase
to 45%. Id.
60. Wolk, supra note 42, at 139-40.
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companies with change-in-control provisions for senior execu-• 61
tives." In addition, a follow-up survey by Hewitt Associates
completed in the first quarter of 2004 found that 68% of For-
tune 200 companies with change-in-control provisions now em-
ploy gross ups. 62 Apparently, even the corporate scandals at
Enron, Global Crossing, and Tyco International have not
caused directors to reconsider the continued use of gross ups.
This practice is extremely expensive and often unknown to
shareholders because it is buried in individual executive em-
ployment agreements. "[T]he gross-up payments must also be
grossed up, and these gross-ups must also be grossed up, and so
on."64 Each incremental gross up is treated as another excess
parachute payment, which makes the gross up subject to the
§ 4999 excise tax and prevents the company from deducting the
65payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Shareholders suffer extraordinarily because gross ups "cost a
company several dollars after taxes for every $1 of after-tax-
payments" received by the executive.66
The current prevalence and intricacies of golden parachute
agreements may be explored by researching executive employ-
ment agreements at some of the largest public corporations in
the United States. There were twenty new and amended em-
ployment agreements containing change-in-control provisions
filed with the SEC in 2003 by the twenty-five largest U.S. pub-
61. HEWITT ASsOcs., LLC, SURVEY FINDINGS: EXECUTIVE CHANGE-IN-
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AT FORTUNE 200 COMPANIES 17 (1999) [hereinafter
1999 HEWITT SURVEY] (on file with author); see also George B. Paulin, Execu-
tive Compensation and Changes in Control: A Search for Fairness,
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 30, 33 (noting that most
surveys conclude that almost half of large and midsize companies provide
gross ups to their executives).
62. HEWITT Assocs., LLC, SURVEY FINDINGS: EXECUTIVE CHANGE-IN-
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AMONG FORTUNE 200 COMPANIES 16 (2003/2004)
[hereinafter 2003/2004 HEWITT SURVEY] (on file with author).
63. Gross ups have been labeled a form of "stealth compensation." CEO
Compensation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Compensation Hearing] (testimony of
Sean Harrigan, President, California Public Employees' Retirement System),
at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=767.
64. Paulin, supra note 61, at 33.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 37.
67. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires disclosure of
plans or arrangements for additional compensation to a firm's top five manag-
ers that will be triggered by a change in control of the issuer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(a)(3), (b)(2)(v)(A)(2) (2003).
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lic companies (based on revenue).68 Of those twenty agree-
ments, half had gross-up provisions. 9 The high percentage of
companies with change-in-control provisions that also provide
gross ups implies that § 280G and § 4999 are not having their
intended effect of reducing executive compensation. Instead,
these sections of the tax code have instigated the practice of us-
ing gross ups, which is even more costly to shareholders.
3. Best-Net Provisions
One way in which § 280G and § 4999 have been partially,
but not entirely, circumvented is with best-net provisions. Best-
net provisions grant the executive either the entire payment
without a gross up or a reduced payment, whichever provides
the executive with more money after considering the impact of
taxes. 0 Best-net provisions are obviously less generous than
gross-up provisions, but more lucrative for executives than hav-
ing no additional protection. The effect of the congressionally
sanctioned standard of reasonableness is still felt because com-
panies automatically go up to the 299% cap. 71 The cap is only
exceeded, however, if it is more lucrative for the executive even
without a gross up being paid. In the 1999 Hewitt Associates
survey, best-net provisions were employed by only seven per-
cent of Fortune 200 companies with change-in-control provi-
68. See Search the EDGAR Database: Companies and Other Filers, SEC,
at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Mar. 21,
2004). The twenty-five largest revenue-producing public companies in the
United States were determined by Fortune's annual survey. Fortune 500 Larg-
est U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2003, at F-1. Employment
agreements are listed as exhibits in the annual Form 10-K filed by each corpo-
ration. The following employment agreements were included in the study:
Robert E. Rubin, Citigroup, Inc.; John A. Graf, American International Group,
Inc.; Rodney 0. Martin, American International Group, Inc.; Charles R. Lee,
Verizon Communications, Inc.; Mary Beth Bardin, Verizon Communications,
Inc.; David Benson, Verizon Communications, Inc.; Ezra D. Singer, Verizon
Communications, Inc.; Doreen A. Toben, Verizon Communications, Inc.;
Franklin D. Raines, Federal National Mortgage Association; James S.
Gorelick, Federal National Mortgage Association; Daniel H. Mudd, Federal
National Mortgage Association; Michael S. Heschel, Kroger Co.; George L.
Fotiades, Cardinal Health, Inc.; James F. Millar, Cardinal Health, Inc.;
Stephen S. Thomas, Cardinal Health, Inc.; Betsy J. Bernard, AT&T Corp.;
David Yost, AmerisourceBergen Corp.; Kurt J. Hilzinger, AmerisourceBergen
Corp.; Michael D. DiCandilo, AmerisourceBergen Corp.; Terrance P. Haas,
AmerisourceBergen Corp.
69. See supra note 68.
70. See Wolk, supra note 42, at 138.
71. See supra Part II.C.1.
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sions for senior executives.72 In Hewitt's most recent survey,
prevalence fell to three percent.73 Given this statistic, it is not
surprising that none of the twenty employment agreements in-
vestigated under Part II.C.2 included best-net provisions.74 Al-
though not popular at this time, best-net provisions are yet an-
other example of how corporate attorneys, accountants, and
businesspeople find ways to minimize the impact of tax disin-
centives.
Ultimately, the negative effects of § 280G and § 4999 are
felt primarily in two ways: (1) companies set parachute pay-
ments at the 299% cap regardless of their specific situations
(which may command a less generous payout); and (2) a major-
ity of companies provide costly gross ups to their executives.
Given these negative effects, Congress's attempts to curb ex-
ecutive compensation through § 280G and § 4999 have proved
not only ineffective, but counterproductive. 5
III. CONGRESS'S ATTEMPT TO CAP EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION WITH § 162(m)
Almost a decade after adding § 280G and § 4999 to the tax
code, Congress enacted § 162(m). 6 The following subparts de-
scribe § 162(m)'s functionality, discuss Congress's intentions
when enacting § 162(m), and analyze the unintended conse-
quences of§ 162(m).
A. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF § 162(m)
Under § 162(m), a public corporation can only deduct $1
million of annual compensation for the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and each of the four most highly compensated employ-
ees, unless the compensation that is in excess of $1 million is
part of a performance-based plan that meets certain criteria.77
72. See 1999 HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 61, at 17.
73. 2003/2004 HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 62, at 16.
74. See supra note 68.
75. Based on a June 2002 poll of "217 executives of Fortune 1000 and
leading industry companies" conducted by Christian & Timbers, an interna-
tional executive search firm, 69% of respondents felt that executive severance
packages are still excessive. Press Release, Christian & Timbers, 69 Percent of
Executives Surveyed Think Severance Packages Are Out of Hand (Aug. 13,
2002), at http://www.ctnet.com/pr/releaseDetails.asp?prid=164.
76. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13211, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000)).
77. See I.R.C. § 162(m).
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To be fully deductible, performance-based compensation must
be based on the attainment of preestablished and objective per-
formance goals designated by a compensation committee "com-
prised solely of [two] or more outside directors" and approved
by a majority vote of shareholders before payment.8 In addi-
tion, the compensation committee must certify that the per-
formance goals were met before payment is granted.79
Generally speaking, stock options are inherently perform-
ance based.8° In fact, certification that the performance goals
have been met is generally unnecessary for stock options
because any money earned by the executive on the options is
generated by an increase in the stock's price, which is theoreti-
cally attributable to corporate performance.8 As long as direc-
tors predetermine the maximum number of stock options that
an executive may receive during a specified period, directors
may adjust the number of options they eventually grant to an
executive.82 If the stock-based compensation is not fully de-
pendent on corporate performance, then it is not considered
performance based.83 If a stock option's exercise price is less
than the stock's value when the option is granted, or "if the ex-
ecutive is otherwise protected from decreases in the stock's
value (such as through automatic repricing), [then] the com-
pensation is not performance-based" and may not be deducted
under § 162(m) if total compensation exceeds $1 million.84
Restricted shares, however, are not necessarily perform-
ance based because, under most restricted-share agreements,
the grantee receives value regardless of whether the share
price increases."5 Unless the grant or vesting of restricted
78. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(ii).
79. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii).
80. See KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-56.
81. Id.
82. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-213, at 587 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1276.
83. See KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-56.
84. Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 587.
85. KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-56. Restricted shares are "common stock
shares released under an agreement whereby they do not [receive] dividends
[and effectively cannot be sold] until some event has taken place-usually the
attainment of certain levels of earnings" or the passage of time. JERRY M.
ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 573 (2d ed.
1985). From a shareholder's perspective, payment in restricted shares is pref-
erable to stock options because restricted shares encourage "executives to fo-
cus on long-term growth and profitability." Ben White, Stock Options Becom-
ing Pay-Plan Dinosaurs? Image-Sensitive Firms Get Creative with Perks,
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shares is contingent on meeting specific performance objectives
and fulfills the other criteria for performance-based compensa-
16tion, the restricted shares will be subject to the $1 million cap.
On the other hand, compensation in the form of contributions
to, or payments from, qualified retirement plans or nontaxable
fringe benefits are not subject to the deduction limitation. Fi-
nally, § 162(m) also provides that any amount denied deducti-
bility under § 280G will reduce the $1 million cap under
§ 162(m) on a dollar-for-dollar basis.88
B. WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO ACCOMPLISH WITH § 162(m)
Congress enacted § 162(m) after the populist outrage over
executive compensation reached a high during the 1992 presi-
dential race. During that race, Governor Bill Clinton stated:
"It's wrong for executives to do what so many did in the 1980s.
The biggest companies raised their [CEOs'] pay by four times
the percentage their workers' pay went up and three times the
percentage their profits went up." 9 A year later in 1993, with
Clinton as President, Congress amended the tax code to add
§ 162(m), a compensation-capping measure.9" According to the
Senate Finance Committee, Congress added § 162(m) because
"the amount of compensation received by corporate executives
has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The committee
believes that excessive compensation will be reduced [by the $1
million cap]."'"
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at El. If the stock price declines while an execu-
tive holds restricted shares, the executive still has a "strong incentive to per-
form" because the shares retain some value until the stock price goes to zero.
Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REv. 201, 219 (1996); see also F.
John Reh, Restricted Stock Is Better Than Stock Options, at
http://management.about.com/cs/adminaccounting/a/restrictedstock.htm (last
visited Dec. 22, 2003).
86. KAFKA, supra note 17, at A-56.
87. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(E) (2000).
88. Id. § 162(m)(4)(F). For example, suppose an executive earned $1 mil-
lion in base compensation for each of the last five years. In year six, he re-
ceives a golden parachute worth $3.5 million. Because the golden parachute
exceeds 300% of his historic base compensation by $500,000, the $500,000 that
is not deductible under § 280G would reduce the $1 million cap imposed by
§ 162(m) by $500,000 for that year.
89. Presidential Candidates Divide on Executive Compensation Caps, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1634 (Oct. 23, 1992).
90. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13,211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (1993).
91. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 103-11, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993
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C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF § 162(m)
After the enactment of § 162(m), many commentators
quickly condemned the $1 million cap.9" According to one com-
mentator, the provision may cause companies to restructure,
but not necessarily reduce, compensation packages.93 Based on
a 2003 research study conducted by Corporate Board Member
magazine and Towers Perrin, 36.2% of responding directors be-
lieved § 162(m) would have some impact on executive compen-
sation policies and practices at their company, while 49.3% be-
lieved that the regulation would have no impact. 94 Since
enactment in 1994, there have been three unintended conse-
quences of § 162(m): (1) $1 million immediately became the
standard executive base salary; (2) there was a shift towards
stock options to compensate executives; and (3) performance-
based pay essentially encouraged executives to focus on and
manipulate short-term earnings at the expense of long-term
value creation.
1. Ante Becomes $1 Million
Experts predicted that "trying to micromanage the pay
process or pay outcomes through federal legislation ... is likely
to be ineffective in solving the problem and may well have
harmful and unintended consequences."" Indeed, after enact-
ment of § 162(m), $1 million became the government-
sanctioned standard for executive base salary.96 To compete for
managerial talent, the market forced companies to meet the $1
million ante. 7 Section 162(m) is even less logical than § 280G
U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877.
92. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2000) (arguing that tax "reform is unlikely
to limit compensation, and it may fuel the increase of compensation"); Mark A.
Salky, Comment, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive
Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
795, 825 (1995) ("[The] IRS approach of [capping] the deduction for excessive
compensation at $1 million is entirely unnecessary and ineffective.").
93. Salky, supra note 92, at 824.
94. Directors and Executive Compensation Study, CORPORATE BD.
MEMBER & TOWERS PERRIN (question 13), at http://www.boardmember.com/
network/cbm...execcomp.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
95. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Brian Hall, Asso-
ciate Professor, Harvard Business School).
96. See id. ("[T]he pay trend ... makes it look as if [§ 162(m)] were passed
with the intention of accelerating, not curbing, CEO pay increases.").
97. See John A. Byrne, That's Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUS. WK., Apr. 25,
1994, at 57 (explaining that the cap has effectively established a standard for
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and § 4999 in this respect because the $1 million cap is not tai-
lored in any way to individual public corporations that face
unique circumstances and different competitive environments.
The appropriate amount and method of compensation varies by
corporation.9 8 For example, a cap of $1 million for John Cough-
lan, the CEO of Lawson Software, which had revenues of $428
million in 2002, may be appropriate, " while that same cap may
be unfair to H. Lee Scott, Jr., the CEO of Wal-Mart Stores,
which had revenues of $246.5 billion in the same year.'00 The $1
million cap is a capricious figure."' The cap also does not take
into account the effects of inflation.' If $1 million was an ap-
propriate cap in 1994, it is arguably inappropriate after a dec-
ade of inflation. Taking inflation into account, the $1 million
cap in 1994 should be adjusted to almost $1.2 million in 2004.103
Thus, by enacting § 162(m), Congress has unintentionally set a
government-sanctioned standard for executive base salary that
fails to take into account the individual circumstances of differ-
ent companies and neglects to recognize the effects of inflation.
2. Stock Options Are Worth Even More
Another detrimental effect of § 162(m) is the increase of
corporations' use of stock options to compensate their execu-
tives. In 1984, less than half of the CEOs running large U.S.
corporations received compensation in the form of stock op-
tions.04 Between 1992 and 2000, however, there was a shift in
the composition of CEO compensation as reported by the Stan-
dard & Poor's 500 Industrials from 27% stock options to 51%
executive pay). The section has also encouraged companies to pay their execu-
tives with stock option grants worth many times the limit because option
grants are deemed performance-based compensation and are exempted from
the cap. See James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Manage-
ment-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 708-09 (1997) (describ-
ing the operation and ramifications of § 162(m)).
98. Brownstein & Panner, supra note 8, at 38.
99. Lawson Software, 2003 Form 10-K (items 1 & 6), at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1141517/000104746903025445/a2115268z10
-k.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
100. Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, supra note 68, at F-1.
101. Salky, supra note 92, at 825.
102. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000).
103. See Gross Domestic Product Deflator Inflation Calculator, at
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
104. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Brian Hall, Asso-
ciate Professor, Harvard Business School).
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stock options.' 6 Option grants have also become "about twice as
large as cash-based pay," and now represent "about two-thirds
of total CEO pay.""0 6
At the same time, stock market valuations increased dra-
matically. "From the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, the
stock markets rose 1400%.,107 The Conference Board reported
in September 2002 that gains in stock options accounted for
approximately 80% of the rise in CEO pay between 1992 and
2000.108 During a congressional hearing on the topic, one execu-
tive compensation expert asserted that the public got what it
asked for when it called for the use of stock options: "we tied
CEO pay to increasing shareholder wealth and shareholder
wealth overall increased dramatically."'0 9 During the same con-
gressional hearing, a business school professor commented that
"[o]ptions became 'icing on the cake' for CEOs in the mid 1980s.
Today, the icing has become the cake." 10 This comment indi-
cates the dramatic rise in the size and value of stock option
grants during the last two decades.
Section 162(m) has encouraged companies to pay their ex-
ecutives with these stock option grants that are worth many
times more than the $1 million limit because option grants eas-
ily qualify as performance-based compensation and thus are
exempted from the cap.'' Since certification that the perform-
ance goals have been met is generally not necessary with stock
options, such options are also easy to implement."' In addition,
many boards of directors do not consider the true economic cost
105. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial
Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 848-
49 (2002). The Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index is the "composite of 425 in-
dustrial stocks, 25 railroad stocks, and 50 utility stocks compiled by the Stan-
dard & Poor's Corporation." HOwARD BRYAN BONHAM, THE COMPLETE
INVESTMENT AND FINANCE DICTIONARY 615 (2001).
106. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Brian Hall, Asso-
ciate Professor, Harvard Business School).




110. Id. (testimony of Brian Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business
School).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84. "At best, these changes
[§ 162(m)] were ineffective. At worst, they distorted pay towards options
(which automatically count as performance-based pay) while contributing to
CEO pay excesses." Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Brian
Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
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of stock options to shareholders.' Many directors currently
"view options to be 'free' or 'costless."' 14 According to Professor
Brian Hall, three factors have led to this incorrect view. First,
the current accounting rules do not require companies to ex-
pense options on the income statement, which makes them ef-
fectively free from an accounting perspective."5 Second, al-
though option grants dilute the shares of current stockholders,
options do not require companies to expend any cash. 116 Third,
because methods for valuating stock options are murky, many
businesspeople assess the costs of options by measuring the
number of options granted rather than the actual value of the
options at the time they are granted."7 He asserts that together
these three factors have caused executive compensation to bur-
geon.'
The requirement that compensation be performance based
to be excluded from the $1 million cap has also left directors
with less discretion when doling out stock options. IRS regula-
tions authorize directors to reduce, but not increase, a stock
grant that has been approved by shareholders."' In an effort to
regain the discretion they had before § 162(m), directors seek a
larger bonus pool without intending to grant the entire pool
when it comes time to allocate it.120 Compensation committees,
however, have been pressured into utilizing more of this larger
pool than they would have awarded if a smaller pool existed.
121
Thus, compensation will likely increase because of the enact-
ment of § 162(m), and there is some evidence that this is occur-
ring.122
3. Focus on Short-Term Results
The shift toward stock options brought about by § 162(m)
also had the unintentional effect of causing CEOs to focus on
stock-price fluctuations and short-term results. Stock options
113. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Brian Hall, Asso-






119. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000); see also supra note 82 and accompanying
text.
120. Loewenstein, supra note 92, at 25.
121. Id.
122. See Loewenstein, supra note 85, at 218 & n.80.
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"encourage excessive risk taking by executives and can prompt
[them] to pursue corporate strategies designed to promote
short-term stock price to the detriment of long-term corporate
value."123 For some executives, because so much of their com-
pensation was tied to stock options, "'there was an irresistible
impulse to cook the books." 124 Executives have an incentive to
adjust accounting methods to prop up their corporation's earn-
ings and stock price until executives sell the options and stock
they receive as compensation.
2 5
Congress recognized this temptation when crafting the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. If an issuer is required to restate
its financials within one year after publication because of mis-
conduct relating to financial reporting requirements, then the
Act provides that the CEO and Chief Financial Officer must
reimburse their company for any "bonus or equity
compensation" they received during that time. 126 As one
commentator noted in a congressional hearing on the topic, "in
the absence of effective corporate governance, mechanical
measures to rein in pay are unlikely to be successful-CEOs
and their consultants can and will game these rules if they
control the processes by which their pay is set."27
4. Where Is the Bite?
Not only has § 162(m) had unintended, negative conse-
quences for executive compensation, but it never really had any
bite. Well-counseled public corporations inevitably connect any
123. 2002 Trends in Executive Pay, AFL-CIO, at http://www.aflcio.org/
corporateamerica/paywatc/pay/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2003). For ex-
ample, Ralston Purina had an incentive plan that rewarded executives nearly
500,000 shares "if the stock closed above 100 for 10 straight days." Dean
Foust, The SEC's CEO-Pay Plan: No Panacea, Bus. WK., July 16, 1992, at 37,
37. Management borrowed funds and diverted much of the company's free
cash flow to tighten the supply and increase the demand for shares by buying
back nearly one-third of the company's outstanding stock. Id. The stock soon
drifted back down, which analysts attributed to "excessive financial engineer-
ing and a lack of attention to core businesses." Id.
124. Joel Hoekstra, Executive Privilege: Has Pay for America's Bosses Spun
Out of Control?, CARLETON C. VOICE, Fall 2003, at 40, 44 (quoting Lawrence
Perlman, former chair and CEO of Ceridian Corporation and former chair of
Seagate Technology).
125. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Damon Silvers,
Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO).
126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
127. Compensation Hearing, supra note 63 (testimony of Damon Silvers,
Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO).
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compensation in excess of the limit to executive performance
and can therefore deduct the entire compensation package of
the executive. 128 As head of the National Economic Council,
former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin helped steer § 162(m)
through Congress in 1993.129 Ironically, Rubin's "guaranteed"
incentive compensation of $14 million at Citigroup today is
fully deductible by the company.130
Deductibility can also simply turn on when the compensa-
tion is paid because compensation that is deferred until retire-
ment is not subject to the cap."' As a result, companies may
take advantage of the deferred compensation loophole. 13 2 Fi-
nally, directors may surrender the deduction for compensation
if shareholders reject the performance goals advanced by the
directors, and thus increase the after-tax cost of executive com-
pensation to the shareholders. 33 Directors may also be less
hesitant to do so because the corporate tax base is eroding. The
pervasiveness of offshore corporate tax shelters now costs the
Treasury approximately $50 billion a year and has reduced
corporate tax payments by 20% annually since 2000.'
34
Thus, while § 162(m) has had no real bite in capping execu-
tive compensation, its negative effects ultimately have been felt
in two ways: (1) companies look to the $1 million cap regardless
of the size or complexity of their organization (which may com-
mand a lower base salary); and (2) companies have doled out
lucrative stock options far exceeding the $1 million cap, causing
executives to focus on short-term, accounting-based results
128. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 233 (rev. 4th ed. 2002).
129. Carol J. Loomis, The Larger-Than-Life Life of Robert Rubin, FORTUNE,
Dec. 8, 2003, at 114, 124.
130. See id. at 123. Rubin's contract guarantees $14 million unless there
are "extraordinary circumstances drastically negatively affecting Citigroup
reported operating results" and Citigroup Chairman Sandy Weill's pay is
docked as well. Id.
131. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(E) (2000).
132. See id.
133. Charles C. Pak, Toward Reasonable Executive Compensation: Outcry
for Reform and Regulatory Response 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633, 662 (1995).
Based on a survey of 155 major corporations in 1994, twenty-five paid their
CEOs more than $1 million in base salary. Graef Crystal, Need a Good Laugh?
Look at Caps on Executive Pay, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at D2. A review of
1995 proxy statements by William M. Mercer, Inc., disclosed that of the 350
companies surveyed, thirty-eight paid base salaries in excess of $1 million.
The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R15.
134. See Press Release, Citizens for Tax Justice, More Corporate Tax Shel-
ters on the Way? (Oct. 14, 2003), at http://www.ctj.orgpdf/corpl003.pdf.
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rather than long-term value creation. Given these negative ef-
fects, Congress's attempts to curb executive compensation
through § 162(m) have proved not only ineffective, but counter-
productive.
IV. COMPENSATION CAPS ARE NOT
EFFECTIVE WITHOUT OR NECESSARY
WITH INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The disincentives provided by § 280G, § 4999, and § 162(m)
have not been successful in curbing corporate greed. Similar fu-
ture tax reform will not be effective unless all directors on the
compensation committee are independent, and compensation
caps will not be necessary if such directors are truly independ-
ent.35 As we have seen with § 280G and § 4999, compensation
caps are often circumvented by directors. They work around
caps by providing gross ups to absorb any would-be penalty to
the executive or by incorporating a best-net provision to give
the executive the best alternative.3 6 Either way, the sharehold-
ers that Congress was trying to protect lose.
Enacting new rules or regulations will not prevent exces-
sive executive compensation. To truly protect shareholders, di-
rectors on the compensation committee must be independent
and engage in arm's length bargaining with managers when
setting executive compensation."' According to corporate gov-
ernance experts, to be completely independent, directors should
not have "inter-locking directorships with other companies,"
and independent directors should not draw "consulting, legal,
or other fees from the company."'38 Another commentator sug-
gests that outside directors be paid with company stock rather
than cash and that their terms be lengthened so they do not be-
come puppets controlled by entrenched management.39
135. Cf. supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting that mechanical
measures to rein in pay are unlikely to be successful in the absence of effective
corporate governance).
136. See supra Part II.C.
137. "[Alt least a majority of members' of a board of directors should be
'independent of management,' and the critical oversight committees-audit,
compensation, and nominating-should be staffed entirely by 'independent' or
'nonmanagement' directors." HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 15, at 699-700
(quoting COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, SECTIONS OF Bus. LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N,
CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 16-17 (2d ed. 1994)).
138. Id. at 712.
139. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solu-
tion, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 939 (1993).
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Since the federal government traditionally has left corpo-
rate law to the states,' 40 states should enact a statute requiring
executive compensation to by determined only be a committee
composed entirely of independent directors. Alternatively, if
states refuse to enact such legislation, shareholders could sub-
mit a proposal to amend the company's articles to include a
provision requiring that all executive compensation be deter-
mined only by a committee of independent directors. In the
heightened corporate governance climate, an increasing num-
ber of shareholder proposals are receiving a majority of share-
holder votes.'4
Once the compensation committee is composed solely of in-
dependent directors, compensation caps no longer become nec-
essary. In practice, compensation caps are detrimental because
they create congressionally sanctioned standards of reason-
ableness.' Regardless of the size, complexity, or risk of a busi-
ness, Congress has applied a one-size-fits-all standard. In some
cases, this standard will encourage small businesses to unnec-
essarily raise their executives' compensation or raise the
benchmark for executive pay in nonpublic corporations, while,
in other cases, this standard will unnecessarily restrain large,
risky, complex businesses from appropriately rewarding their
executives. 1
43
Section 162(m), for example, strongly discourages compa-
nies from paying executives exactly what they believe they are
worth.14 Instead, to be fully deductible, independent directors
must preestablish objective performance goals and put them in
writing before the service commences. Such goals are inher-
ently inexact. Sometimes they are set too high, while other
times they are set too low.
In addition, objective, measurable goals do not assess all
aspects of an executive's performance. There may be compo-
nents beyond stock price or net profit, such as employee reten-
tion or public relations, that are intangible or immeasurable
140. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 15, at 716. But see id. (noting
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "the deepest incursion by the federal govern-
ance into the internal affairs of U.S. corporations").
141. See supra Part II.C.1.
142. See supra Parts II.C.1, III.C.1.
143. See supra Parts II.C.1, III.C.1.
144. See supra Part III.C.1.
145. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; Inez H. Friedman, Note,
The Deductibility of Executive Compensation: Automotive Investment, Pulsar
Components, and New Section 162(m), 48 TAX LAW. 255, 263 (1994).
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components of an executive's performance. 4 6 Under § 162(m), it
becomes more difficult or costly for directors to single out these
aspects of an executive's performance because it is difficult to
preestablish objective goals for such performance factors. As a
result, directors primarily use stock price as a scorecard for
performance. This causes executives to focus primarily on
short-term earnings rather than long-term corporate value be-
cause they have so much riding on the stock options."'
The move towards stock options is yet another example of
the inexactness of preestablished performance goals. 148 In the
case of stock options, even independent directors lose control
over executive compensation. 149 The options granted to the ex-
ecutive may double or triple in value in a short amount of time.
Indeed, directors could not have predicted that the stock mar-
ket would rise by 1400% between the early 1980s to the end of
the 1990s.1
50
As long as the directors on the compensation committee are
independent, it would be better to allow directors total discre-
tion to reward executives with the exact compensation they de-
serve rather than subject them to ineffective regulation under
the tax code. They should be able to easily set goals with re-
spect to any aspect of the executive's performance. They should
be able to control exactly how much they are compensating the
executive rather than waiting to see how the stock market per-
forms, which may be dependent on many factors other than ex-
ecutive performance. Without exactness, directors are inclined
to award too much or to focus exclusively on such aspects as
stock price. As long as they are independent, directors should
be given the freedom to craft goals as they wish and should not
be discouraged from using compensation tools other than stock
options that allow directors to more accurately predict how
much compensation their executives will realize.
CONCLUSION
Congressional attempts to cap executive compensation
through the tax code have caused unintended consequences
146. See Friedman, supra note 145, at 267.
147. See supra Part III.C.3.
148. See supra Part III.C.2.
149. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (noting the unexpected
and unpredictable rise in the value of stock options since the 1980s).
150. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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that outweigh any benefit they may have created. As a result of
§ 280G and § 4999, companies gravitate to the 299% cap re-
gardless of their specific situation, and a majority of companies
provide costly gross ups to their executives. As a result of
§ 162(m), $1 million has become the government-sanctioned
standard for executive base salary, and companies are pushed
to use lucrative stock options that have caused executives to fo-
cus on short-term, accounting-based results to the detriment of
shareholders. Further attempts to cap executive compensation
by providing disincentives through the tax code will not be ef-
fective. Without compensation committees composed solely of
independent directors who assess the worth of the company's
executives at arm's length, compensation caps will simply be
circumvented with the assistance of creative lawyers, account-
ants, and compensation experts. Sadly, indirect routes to gen-
erous executive compensation are usually even more costly to
shareholders than if the executives were paid directly. Execu-
tives remain generously compensated while shareholders suffer
as their companies are compelled to pay additional taxes for
nondeductible compensation and grant stock options that cre-
ate perverse incentives. If executives' compensation is deter-
mined by an independent compensation committee, then com-
pensation caps implemented through the tax code simply
inhibit a board's ability to determine exactly the amount of
compensation that its executives merit and the caps should
thus not be applicable.
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